This paper attempts at contributing to the ongoing debate on the historical roots of the high economic inequality of contemporary Iberian America. Basically empirical, our approach departs from mainstream scholarship. We show new data on wages and heights in several viceroyalties that: 1) suggest relatively medium to high levels of material welfare among the commoners in Bourbon Hispanic America; 2) allow us to build indexes of economic inequality. An international comparison of those indexes casts some doubts on the widely accepted view that Viceroyal America's economy was exclusively based on extremely unequal or extractive institutions, as it has been popularized by the influential works by Engerman and Sokoloff (1994 , 2002 , Acemoglu et al. (2002) .
I. Introduction
Economic inequality in contemporary Iberian America has become a fashionable topic.
And not without good reason, since it is, along with Sub-Saharan Africa, the most unequal region in the world [López and Perry (2008) ]. For The Economist: "Inequality is as Latin American as good dance music and magical-realist fiction." 1 Has economic inequality been, as the danzón, which was already danced by late eighteenth century in the Caribbean, conspicuously Iberian American since colonial times? Or did it appear, as the literary magical-realism did, much more recently? Very likely, most economist and economic historians would answer the first question affirmatively.
On the contrary, our provisional answer, based on the evidence presented in this paper, is sceptical. Moreover, it is our contention that the empirical foundations, in particular those of quantitative character, of the popular idea that Iberian American economic inequality has colonial origins are rather unconvincing than not. Sometimes they are simply non-existent at all 2 .
The hypothesis that not only high inequality but also low growth in Iberian
America are deeply rooted in colonial times has been defended in a series of brilliant, influential, and, to a large extent, convergent, works by Engerman and Sokoloff (1994 , 2002 and Acemoglu et al. (2002) . On the basis of the alleged existence of either "extractive" institutions or institutions producing extreme economic inequality the Iberian colonial legacy is blamed for the creation of a "reversal of fortune" among European colonies in the Americas -the poorest one circa 1500 (i. e. the USA) became richer while the initially richest ones (i.e. Mexica and Inca empires) became poorer-or of an adverse development path that differs sharply from the one followed by the United
States.
colonial origins of the contemporary uneven regional distribution of assets, income and human capital. Just mentioning some words with carry strong negative connotations (mita, encomienda and hacienda, mainly) or referring to those authors that mention them (Engerman and Sokoloff and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson) is taken as a valid proof of the centuries-long existence of extractive institutions and of extreme economic inequality. No attempt is made at analyzing the real impact across time and space of those institutions.
Thus, it is possible to consider mining as an extractive or extremely unequal institution is spite of the fact that, according to Humboldt (1822) Velasco (1989) minimizes the importance of coerced labour in late Bourbon Mexico mines and points at the wage differential as the main factor behind the inflow of free workers into the expanding mining sector. Northern mining centres were populated by free immigrants who felt the attraction of higher living standards [Swann (1990) ]. The mobility and the high wages of miners are also highlighted by Brading (1983) . The disregard shown for these sources might explain why the early appearance of a genuine market for free, mobile, and well-paid labour in most of New Spain's mining centres have passed largely unnoticed by the neo-institutionalists 8 .
It is true that in an unknown number of mining centres some forms of coerced labour were circumstantially permitted [Brading (1983) , Velasco (1989) , Ladd (1992 ), Von Metz (1998 ), Sánchez Santiró (2002 ]. However, their effective contribution to the 4 Humboldt, 1822, vol. 3, p. 246. 5 Ibidem. 6 Ladd, 1992 , p. 54. 7 Brading, 1983 That wages in the mining sector of New Spain were high is a well-established fact in the specialized literature: "En el primer siglo del período colonial, la despoblación hizo que los trabajadores fueran escasos y abrió el camino no sólo para la introducción de un sistema salarial, sino también para el pago de de salarios lo suficientemente elevados (o con incentivos agregados) como para atraer a los trabajadores. " Garner, 1992, pp. 113-114. total supply of labour for mining is not generally well-determined. At least in one case, that of Conde de Regla in 1764, it was insignificant 9 . In this respect, Brading (1983) claim that many New Spain's mining camps looked similar "to the British ports of the same period" may turn out relevant to the discussion on the persistence of some forms of compulsion on labour in particular parts and moments of a basically free market.
Comments by Humboldt on miners' wages seem also to be reliable. They find supportive evidence in Dobado and García (2009) . Their estimates of the purchasing power in terms of grain and meat of the wages of Guanajuato skilled and unskilled miners by early nineteenth century are surprisingly high by international standards -see Section II.
As to mining in the Andes, even in Potosí, where mita stands for centuries as a genuine instance of coerced labour, free miners were important. By early seventeenth century, almost half of the indigenous labour force employed in silver production was free [Bakewell (1989) ].
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Still more complex is the picture of the labour market in Potosí shown by Assadourian (1987) : at the very most, between one quarter and one third of the total labour force in the town was coerced (mitayos) while the rest was free.
In the mining sector, the shares were roughly the same. By late eighteenth century the number of free Indians working in flourishing Potosí's mining sector slightly exceeded that of mitayos while the latter and their families constituted a minority -around a quarter-of the town's population [Tandeter (1992) ]. On the other hand, one thing was the quota of men legally established and quite another one the effective flow of mitayos from indigenous communities into mining centres and that this gap tended to increase in the course of time [(Garavaglia and Marchena (2005) ]. Besides, it also neglects the important fact that mita never existed at all in some main Andean mining centres -i. e.
Oruro and Lower Peru-and therefore paying wages was the only mechanism in place for attracting labour to them [Bakewell (2004) , Garavaglia and Marchena (2005) ]. Free labour played an important role in the gold mining boom of the late colonial period in Colombia, Ecuador and Chile [Garavaglia and Marchena (2005) ]. More generally, free markets for labour, which ought to be included among those institutions defined by Acemoglu et al. (2002) as "institutions of private property", did not exist in preColumbian America.
9 Velasco, 1989, p. 580. 10 The conversion of the nominal wages offered by Bakewell (1989) and Tandeter (1992 Tandeter ( , 1999 into silver grams shows that both mitayos and, especially, free miners had daily earnings higher than those of most labourers in Europe.
Mining is also defined as a "bad" institution by Bruhn and Gallego (2008) . Quite surprisingly, circa 1800, almost 4,500 "pueblos de indios" had legal entity status and collectively owned substantial portions of not necessarily unfertile land [Tanck (1999 [Tanck ( , 2005 15 . In fact, many "pueblos de indios"
11 "We claim that some of these activities were"bad" since they tended to create extractive institutions and encouraged fewer Europeans to settle in the area due to the fact that the production technology was inherently repressive. These activities are plantation agriculture involving slavery and other forms of coerced labor (sugar, cotton, rice, and tobacco) and mining." Bruhn and Gallego, 2008, p. 1. 12 In Guanajuato, the main mining town in eighteenth century New Spain, the share of those classified as "whites" or "Spanish" in the male active population almost reaches 40 per cent. In Potosí, 16 per cent of the population was formed by "blanco" in 1779. This ratio is probably higher than that of whites to total population in Upper Peru. . Thus, Bourbon Mexico might well no be the only land of economic inequality after all. In this respect, in his re-examination of inequality in Iberian American over the last five centuries, Williamson (2009) criticizes the assumption that it has always been relatively unequal by international standards and defends its "normality" since the pre-Columbian era to the "belle époque".
Apart from this introduction, this article contains four sections. In Section 2, evidence on nominal and real wages by early nineteenth century is presented. Section 3 deals with heights in the eighteenth century. Indexes of economic inequality built on ratios relating GDP per capita to real (grain) wages and heights are shown in Section 4.
Some final remarks appear in Section 5. Sources of data and methods of estimation are described in Appendix 1 on wages and Appendix 2 on heights.
20 Humboldt, 1822 Humboldt, :1991 25 Grain wage is the purchasing power of a daily nominal wage in terms of litres of the most common grain in the respective consumption basket of the working classes. For more details, see Appendix 1 in Dobado and García (2009) . 26 Meat wage is the purchasing power of a daily nominal wage in terms of kilos of beef. For more details, see Appendix 1 in Dobado and García (2009). (sugar and cocoa) might also be comparatively cheap for late colonial Mexico consumers.
Thus, Bourbon Mexico miners do not seem to be the epitome of extreme exploitation. High wages are rather incompatible than not with extractive institutions.
Why should then mining be considered more "extractive" in New Spain than in England or other parts of Europe?
In Figure 1 , nominal wages of generally urban labourers in 1800-1820 are depicted 27 .
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE Again, the high level of nominal wages in Hispanic America relative to other parts of the world might be considered expectable. More surprising is to realize that they were also high in terms of grain -see Figure 2 -and, especially, of meat -see Figure   3 28 .
INSERT FIGURE 2 AND FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
Certainly the early nineteenth century was not a favourable period for lowincome consumers in Europe. However, it was probably even worse in Hispanic America where some of the conflicts surrounding the process of independence were especially violent and long-lasting. Consequently, they had important negative effects on the demand for labour and on the supply of basic goods. In any case, the picture shown by available evidence on grain and meat wages from 1800-1820 is that of living standards of late Bourbon America labourers being much closer to -or even higher than in some cases-those of the US and most developed countries in Western Europe than to those of poorer Central and Mediterranean Europe -including Iberian metropolis-and, especially, of Asia. Thus, while New Spain miners clearly belonged to the upper world class of labourers, Bourbon America unskilled workers were far from being at the bottom of the international distribution of wage-earners fortunes. This is all but surprising since, contrary to neo-institutionalist assumptions, what characterizes labour markets in Bourbon America is the relative scarcity of this factor and not the opposite.
According to Bulmer-Thomas (1994) , there was "a traditional labour shortage, from which many colonial activities had suffered."
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Finding medium to high relative real wages in Bourbon America might be interpreted as an indication that labour productivity could not be significantly lower there than in most late pre-industrial European countries. This inference does not seem to be implausible under reasonable suppositions: similar number of working days per year; similar differences in productivity between wage-earners and other segments of the labouring classes -i. e. peasants. The proximity in productivity levels might have implications for estimates of GDP per capita. It suggests that an upward revision of estimates by Coatsworth (2008) and Maddison (2009) would not be unjustified.
Naturally, much more evidence confirming our findings is needed. On the other hand, extending our rather optimistic tentative conclusions about the material welfare of wage-earners to other unprivileged sections of the Bourbon Americas societies is a risky business. We should know much more about the living conditions of other segments of the commoners -i. e. peasants. Notwithstanding, until further research proves otherwise, we provisionally accept that our findings on real wages in Bourbon America are as representative of the commoners living conditions as in other parts of the world.
III. Heights in Bourbon Mexico and Venezuela
In this section we present new quantitative evidence on heights in Bourbon Mexico and Venezuela. Studying physical statures from an international comparative perspective plays a double role in our research: it is interesting in itself and serves as a relevant check of our findings on wages. If our sample is representative -nothing suggests the opposite-, what we have found is that heights in late colonial Hispanic America are comparable to those in Europe in spite of its allegedly lower GDP per capita. These findings are consistent with those obtained through the examination of wages in which they do not confirm the widespread idea of an especially unequal colonial society in Hispanic America -see Section IV.
As a result of the growing popularity of anthropometrics after some decades of existence, Iberian America started to appear in a picture in which numerous social groups, countries and periods were already present from much longer [i. e. Komlos and Baten (2004) , Steckel (1995) , (2008), (2009) 31 Representativeness of the data base is greater than in the case of a professional army since militias were formed through universal adult male conscription of which only those suffering from serious physical handicaps or below the minimum height requirement, the public servants and the high skilled professionals were excepted [Marchena (1992) . 32 Pardos (mulatoes) have not been included in the sample order to make a comparison as ethnically homogeneous as possible in order to reduce the possible bias due to genetic differences. Studying heights offers an interesting direct measure of economic inequality: the racial gap. The difference in heights between "blancos" and "pardos" is perceptible by mid eighteenth century in Southern Mexico (less than 3 centimetres) and in Maracaibo (around 1.5 centimetres). However, it tended to decrease in both cases from the 1730s to the 1780s [Dobado and García (2009) ]. In Southern Mexico, the gap narrows from about four centimetres to practically null. Moreover, the gap we find is significantly smaller than the one observed between different social classes in some European countries [Komlos (2007) ]. The racial gap in Maracaibo is similar to that existing between black slaves and free whites in the US by the same period [Margo and Steckel (1983) , Steckel (1986) ] and higher than that estimated for Brazil and Lima in the nineteenth century by Baten et al. (2009a) . To summarize, improvable as they are, our provisional estimates on average heights of Mexicans and Venezuelans of the Bourbon period are basically similar to those of Europeans, while the racial gap is comparatively small and decreasing. These findings may be interpreted as evidence against the idea of an especially unequal Bourbon Hispanic America. 33 As to the cases of France, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Portugal, Russia and Spain see, respectively, Heyberger (2005) , Komlos (1989) , Breschi and Pozzi (eds.) (2007), Baten et al. (2009b) , Mironov (2005) . 34 See Dobado and García (2009) for an explanation of the reasons explaining the possible downward bias.
IV. Wages, heights and GDPs per capita
In this section we present indexes of economic inequality in late Bourbon America.
Those indexes consist of the ratio of GDP per capita in 1820 to grain wages in 1800-1820 and of the ratios of GDP per capita in 1700 and 1720 to heights by mid eighteenth century.
In considering the ratio of GDP per capita to grain wages, especially those of unskilled workers as a proxy for economic inequality, we draw on the pioneering work by Williamson (1999 Williamson ( , 2002 . In fact, what we do is trying to adapt his methodology, Certainly, using a less crude way of calculating real wages would offer somewhat different results. Missing data for some years might also be altering the ratio corresponding to some countries. However, a shift from low to high levels of Williamson's economic inequality is rather unlikely than not. Besides, if instead of using grain prices as deflator of nominal wages we use those of meat -or a combination of the two-the ratio of GDP per capita to real wages for Bolivia, Colombia and Mexico would be lower and consequently, by construction, our ad hoc version of the Williamson's economic inequality would decrease. In any case, whatever the change, if reasonable, in the inputs used for calculation of this measure of economic inequality, a very different picture to that shown in Figure 5 seems rather implausible. Therefore, it is our provisional conclusion that late Bourbon America does not stand at the top of the international ranking of the Williamson's economic inequality index. If alternative, somewhat lower, estimates of Hispanic American countries GDPs per capita in 1820 provided by Coatsworth (2008) and Prados (2007b) is also striking that small differences in GDPs per capita estimates coexist with big differences in nominal (grams of silver) and grain wages -i. e. Bolivia versus Japan.
Again, this counterintuitive result seems worth being explored as well.
We have also explored the potential of an additional and complementary approach to the study of economic inequality when direct evidence on income distribution is doubtfully reliable or non-existent at all, as it usually happens in early modern societies. As mentioned before, the anthropometric literature has been producing substantial arguments and evidence supporting the notion that heights are very sensitive to economic inequality [Steckel (1995 [Steckel ( , 2005 [Steckel ( , 2009 ]. Based on the abovementioned literature, which causally links economic equality and average height, our reasoning is similar to the one previously presented regarding real wages. It is our assumption that, ceteris paribus, for a certain level of GDP per capita, the higher the average height in a given country, the less economic inequality might be expected. In other words, finding heights in Bourbon Mexico or Venezuela comparable to those in presumably more developed countries would cast serious doubt on the plausibility of mainstream assumptions on the colonial roots of economic inequality in Iberian America.
Thus, we present a first exploration of a methodology that, to the best of our knowledge, has not been used before empirically. This methodological novelty simply consists in calculating ratios of GDPs per capita to average heights for as many countries as possible. These ratios might constitute an alternative index of economic inequality. The underlying rationale is not only fairly intuitive but also consistent with the currently available evidence on some developed countries [Bilger (2004) ]. In Figure   6 , the ratio of GDP per capita in 1700 and 1820 to average heights of cohorts of those born in 1750-1760 calculated for sample of European and American countries is shown.
INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE
In 1700 as well as in 1820, the ratios of both Northern and Southern Mexico and, particularly, Venezuela are significantly lower than those of Europe. If this tentative index of economic inequality makes any sense, the inference is clear: those Hispanic American for which we have so far found original sources for heights do not seem to be among the most unequal societies of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
Again rather the opposite is true. We find the basic consistency between the two indexes of inequality presented here especially reassuring.
V. Final remarks
1) Much more empirical research is needed to widen the -so far too smallquantitative information on which most claims about Viceroyal America economic inequality are commonly based. The gap between strong assumptions and weak -or inexistent at all-empirical evidence should urgently be closed. Otherwise, the economic conditions prevailing in the American territories of the Spanish monarchy and their consequences on economic development could not be properly assessed. The importance of the issue goes far beyond academic debates.
2) In this article we present an ad hoc version of the Williamson's inequality index (the ratio of GDP per capita in 1820 to grain wages in 1800-1820) and our own inequality index (the ratio of GDP per capita in 1700 and 1820 to average height in 1750-1760) for a sample of American, Asian and European countries. I t a l y A u s t r i a P o r t u g a l N e t h e r l a n d s K o r e a S w e d e n J a p a n S p a i n B e l g i u m G e r m a n y C h i n a Source: See Appendix 2.
